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Policy Profile

ID
Policy Question
Responses
FINT.19
Is tiered implementation of Basel pillars proportionate to sector characteristics?
Adopted and accepted by assessors 6 Adopted but not accepted by assessors 8 Not adopted 21
Adopted and accepted by assessors 6 Countries
South Africa
Vanuatu
Russia
Bangladesh
Burundi
Ecuador
Adopted but not accepted by assessors 8 Countries
Palestine
Palestine
Seychelles
Honduras
Philippines
Afghanistan
Angola
Mongolia
Not adopted 21 Countries
Bhutan
Cambodia
Guatemala
Malawi
Sao Tome and Principe
Haiti
Tajikistan
Georgia
Argentina
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Tonga
El Salvador
Bangladesh
Fiji
Mexico
Jordan
Nigeria
Egypt
Thailand
Haiti
FINT.20
How the definition of new credit categories adopted in your country?
Adopted and accepted by assessors 7 Adopted but not accepted by assessors 11 Not adopted 15
Adopted and accepted by assessors 7 Countries
South Africa
Vanuatu
Russia
Nigeria
Egypt
Burundi
Ecuador
Adopted but not accepted by assessors 11 Countries
Palestine
Seychelles
Honduras
Tajikistan
Georgia
Philippines
Argentina
Afghanistan
Angola
Mongolia
Mexico
Not adopted 15 Countries
Bhutan
Cambodia
Guatemala
Malawi
Sao Tome and Principe
Haiti
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Tonga
El Salvador
Bangladesh
Fiji
Jordan
Thailand
Bangladesh
FINT.21
How is the use of Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach assessed?
Adopted and accepted by assessors 3 Adopted but not accepted by assessors 6 Not adopted 26
Adopted and accepted by assessors 3 Countries
South Africa
Vanuatu
Ecuador
Adopted but not accepted by assessors 6 Countries
Palestine
Malawi
Russia
Angola
Mongolia
Mexico
Not adopted 26 Countries
Bhutan
Cambodia
Guatemala
Seychelles
Sao Tome and Principe
Honduras
Haiti
Tajikistan
Georgia
Philippines
Argentina
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Afghanistan
Tonga
El Salvador
Bangladesh
Fiji
Jordan
Nigeria
Egypt
Thailand
Bangladesh
Burundi
Lesotho
Lesotho
FINT.22
Are there other proportionate approaches adopted in your country to mitigate the impact of Basel framework on financial inclusion?
No 29 Yes (please specify) 6
No 29 Countries
Bhutan
Cambodia
Guatemala
Palestine
Seychelles
Malawi
Sao Tome and Principe
Vanuatu
Honduras
Haiti
Tajikistan
Georgia
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Afghanistan
Tonga
Angola
El Salvador
Bangladesh
Fiji
Mongolia
Mexico
Mexico
Jordan
Nigeria
Egypt
Thailand
Bangladesh
Haiti
Yes (please specify) 6 Countries
South Africa
Philippines
Argentina
Russia
Burundi
Burundi
FINT.22.a
How have assessors assessed these other approaches?
Accepted by assessors 3 Not accepted by assessors 5
Accepted by assessors 3 Countries
Egypt
Bangladesh
Burundi
Not accepted by assessors 5 Countries
South Africa
South Africa
Philippines
Argentina
Russia
FINT.23
What are the key challenges faced in implementing the Basel Framework in a proportionate manner?
Assessors do not accept proportionate approaches and do not consider financial inclusion as a policy objective 1 Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards 1 Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately 4 Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, Other (please specify) 2 Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance 3 National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards 1 National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards 1 National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, Other (please specify) 1 National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately 1 Other (please specify) 9 Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards, Other (please specify) 1
Assessors do not accept proportionate approaches and do not consider financial inclusion as a policy objective 1 Countries
Mongolia
Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards 1 Countries
Haiti
Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately 4 Countries
Seychelles
Tajikistan
Fiji
Burundi
Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, Other (please specify) 2 Countries
Sao Tome and Principe
Afghanistan
Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 Countries
Palestine
National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance 3 Countries
South Africa
Vanuatu
Jordan
National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards 1 Countries
Nigeria
National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards 1 Countries
Honduras
National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 Countries
Cambodia
National regulators apply standards conservatively due to uncertainty of assessors stance, Inadequacies in national infrastructure and systems to capture relevant data and develop standards, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Angola
National regulators lack expertise and knowledge to develop proportionate standards, National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately, Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards 1 Countries
Bangladesh
National supervisors lack expertise and knowledge to supervise proportionately 1 Countries
Sierra Leone
Other (please specify) 9 Countries
Guatemala
Malawi
Georgia
Philippines
Tanzania
Russia
Mexico
Egypt
Ecuador
Regulatees lack understanding on the policy intent of standards, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
El Salvador
FINT.24
Does your country define shadow banking?
No 5 Yes 2
No 5 Countries
Bangladesh
Haiti
Ecuador
Egypt
Lesotho
Yes 2 Countries
Haiti
Burundi
FINT.24.a
Is your country’s definition of β€œShadow Banking” the same as the Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s definition?
No, my country’s definition of Shadow Banking is different from the FSB’s definition (Please specify) 1 To some extent 5 Yes, my country’s definition of Shadow Banking is the same as the FSB’s definition. 12
No, my country’s definition of Shadow Banking is different from the FSB’s definition (Please specify) 1 Countries
Bangladesh
To some extent 5 Countries
Thailand
Brazil
Samoa
Namibia
Cambodia
Yes, my country’s definition of Shadow Banking is the same as the FSB’s definition. 12 Countries
Sudan
Kyrgyz Republic
Sudan
Tanzania
Mozambique
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Rwanda
Philippines
Solomon Islands
Burundi
FINT.24.b
Which institutions constitute the shadow banking system in your country?
Cooperatives, Non-bank providers of financing 1 Cooperatives, Other (please specify) 2 Cooperatives, Pawnbrokers, Money lenders, Building Societies 2 Fund management industry 1 Money lenders 2 Non-bank providers of financing 1 Non-bank providers of financing, Social securities organizations, Other (please specify) 1 Other (please specify) 4 Pawnbrokers, Money lenders, Non-bank providers of financing, Other (please specify) 1 Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Building Societies, Other (please specify) 1 Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Other (please specify) 1 Pension and Provident funds, Development financial institutions, Cooperatives, Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Leasing and Financing Companies 1 Pension and Provident funds, Other (please specify) 1
Cooperatives, Non-bank providers of financing 1 Countries
Burundi
Cooperatives, Other (please specify) 2 Countries
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Cooperatives, Pawnbrokers, Money lenders, Building Societies 2 Countries
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Fund management industry 1 Countries
Brazil
Money lenders 2 Countries
Haiti
Haiti
Non-bank providers of financing 1 Countries
Tanzania
Non-bank providers of financing, Social securities organizations, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Solomon Islands
Other (please specify) 4 Countries
Thailand
Thailand
Rwanda
Namibia
Pawnbrokers, Money lenders, Non-bank providers of financing, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Cambodia
Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Building Societies, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Philippines
Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Kyrgyz Republic
Pension and Provident funds, Development financial institutions, Cooperatives, Pawnbrokers, Non-bank providers of financing, Leasing and Financing Companies 1 Countries
Haiti
Pension and Provident funds, Other (please specify) 1 Countries
Sudan
FINT.24.c
What is the current approximate size of the perceived shadow banking system?
0% - 10% 2 10% - 20% 2 21% - 40% 1 Don't know 10
0% - 10% 2 Countries
Tanzania
Solomon Islands
10% - 20% 2 Countries
Brazil
Mozambique
21% - 40% 1 Countries
Bangladesh
Don't know 10 Countries
Thailand
Sudan
Kyrgyz Republic
Sudan
Bangladesh
Rwanda
Namibia
Philippines
Haiti
Burundi
FINT.24.d
What are the measures used to monitor developments in the shadow banking sector?
Cooperation and coordination mechanism with other domestic regulatory authorities 2 Legislative and governance framework, Monitoring and oversight framework, Cooperation and coordination mechanism with other domestic regulatory authorities 1 Monitoring and oversight framework 1
Cooperation and coordination mechanism with other domestic regulatory authorities 2 Countries
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Legislative and governance framework, Monitoring and oversight framework, Cooperation and coordination mechanism with other domestic regulatory authorities 1 Countries
Burundi
Monitoring and oversight framework 1 Countries
Haiti
FINT.25
Does your country have a deposit insurance scheme?
No 5 Yes 3
No 5 Countries
Haiti
Haiti
Burundi
Egypt
Lesotho
Yes 3 Countries
Bangladesh
Haiti
Ecuador
FINT.25.a
Does your country implement the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) Core Principles?
No 2 Yes 2
No 2 Countries
Haiti
Burundi
Yes 2 Countries
Bangladesh
Ecuador
FINT.25.b
How does the deposit insurance framework in your country treat digital deposit-like stored value products?
Exclusion (Not covered by deposit insurance) 4 Indirect approach (Deposit insurance covers custodial pooled account of all customer funds) 1
Exclusion (Not covered by deposit insurance) 4 Countries
Haiti
Eswatini
Burundi
Ecuador
Indirect approach (Deposit insurance covers custodial pooled account of all customer funds) 1 Countries
Bangladesh
FINT.24.e
How do you think the risks of shadow banking activities can be mitigated?
Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime 2 Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime 2 Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions 2 Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities 2 Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 8 Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1
Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime 2 Countries
Sudan
Haiti
Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Countries
Bangladesh
Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Countries
Namibia
Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime 2 Countries
Bangladesh
Haiti
Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions 2 Countries
Eswatini
Ecuador
Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities 2 Countries
Rwanda
Solomon Islands
Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Countries
Thailand
Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Availability of granular data on shadow banking activities, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 8 Countries
Brazil
Sudan
Tanzania
Mozambique
Samoa
Philippines
Cambodia
Burundi
Through proportionate regulation and supervision for non- bank financial institutions, Through a comprehensive consumer financial protection regime, Coordination among relevant domestic authorities including international cooperation 1 Countries
Kyrgyz Republic
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